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THE STATUS OF THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN VIRGINIA
I. HISTORY
The past three decades have seen third-party practice in Virginia insti-
tuted, abolished and revived. The practice was first sanctioned by a 1948
amendment to the Virginia Code of 1919.' In the 1949 case of Masters v.
Hart,2 it was held that by virtue of the 1948 amendment the trial court
could, in its discretion, permit third parties to be impleaded as the inter-
ests of justice may require. However, the supreme court in that decision
also pointed out that the amendment was both confusing and incomplete;
and, also noted that in order for a complete system of third-party practice
to be adopted the statute would have to be clarified by general rules of
court or appropriate legislation.
The General Assembly did not respond to the supreme court's sugges-
tion. Instead, effective October 1, 1951, the supreme court simply abol-
ished third-party practice in Virginia by adopting Rule 3:9.1.3 In 1954, the
General Assembly amended the statute (now identified as § 8-96 of the
1950 Code) and thereby repealed the statutory authority for third-party
practice.4
However, third-party practice was re-established in Virginia effective
March 1, 1972, when the supreme court adopted the current Rule 3:10. The
Rule presently provides in part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may file and serve a third-party motion for judgment
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. (emphasis added).
I. THE PURPOSES OF THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
The principal function of any impleader rule is to promote judicial econ-
1. Section 6102 of the Code of 1919, as amended by Chapter 394 of the Acts of 1948. That
statute, with the pertinent part of the 1948 amendment italicized, reads as follows:
No action or suit shall abate or be defeated by the non-joinder or misjoinder of
parties, plaintiff or defendant, but whenever such misjoinder or non-joinder shall be
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, new parties may be added and parties
misjoined may be dropped by order of the court at any stage of the cause as the ends
of justice may require; and such new parties defendant may be added upon the affida-
vit and motion of any defendant, where it appears that such parties are or may be
liable to such plaintiff or defendant for all or part of plaintiff's claim .....
2. 189 Va. 969, 55 S.E.2d 205 (1949).
3. Rule 3:9.1 stated in part: "Third-party practice is abolished and no defendant shall be
permitted to bring in a new party. . ....
4. The amendment consisted of deleting the italicized language in note 1, supra.
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omy. Via third-party practice, all parties with an interest at stake in a
particular transaction or occurrence are brought before the court which
allows for a complete disposition of the matter. This results in the resolu-
tion of all common questions of law and fact in a single suit. As a conse-
quence, any duplication of expenses or danger of inconsistent results is
avoided. Besides saving precious judicial time (as well as that of the par-
ties, the witnesses, and the attorneys), any circuity of action or multiplic-
ity of actions is prevented as well. The use of impleader also avoids the
long time delay involved in rendering a judgment against the original
defendant and then obtaining a judgment in his favor against the third
party defendant.5
III. CONTROVERSY, CONFUSION AND THE "NEWPORT NEWS RULE"
In at least one informal survey taken since Rule 3:10 was revived in 1972,
it was indicated that there are a number of judicial circuits within Virginia
that have not recognized third-party practice in actions for contribution
or indemnification Instead, these circuits have appparently approved of
the theory known as the "Newport News Rule," which generally requires
5. American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 262 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1958), affl'd, 266 F.2d 82
(4th Cir. 1959); B&O v. Saunders, 159 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1947); Note, Seventeenth Annual
Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1971-1972, 58 VA. L. REv. 1159, 1322-23 (1972).
6. The informal survey was the product of Richard Wright West, Esq. of Newport News
who presented his results and views on the subject in the Virginia Association of Defense
Attorneys Newsletter of May 1976 at pages 7-11. He also did an update on the same subject
in Vol. 2, No. 1, pages 4 and 5 of the same publication. A further related article, not authored
by Mr. West, was also published in that publication in Vol. 3, No. 2 at pages 21-24.
According to the survey, the following courts are on record as not having implemented Rule
3:10 in contribution or indemnification actions in the Virginia circuit court system: the 7th
circuit (Newport News), the 8th circuit (Hampton), the 19th circuit (Fairfax Co.), and the
26th circuit (Rockingham Co.). At one time, Federal Judges Kellam and MacKenzie (both
E.D. Va.) were also in that camp, although Mr. West later advises that they have apparently
switched over and now permit impleader actions in these type cases.
The following courts, as indicated by the survey, take the opposite stance and do allow
third-party practice in contribution and indemnification actions. In the state judicial system,
the adherents are the 3rd circuit (Portsmouth), the 4th circuit (Norfolk), the 9th circuit
(Williamsburg and York Co.), the 13th circuit (Richmond), the 14th circuit (Henrico Co.),
and the 30th circuit (Norton, Lee Co., Scott Co., and Wise Co.). Federal Judges Merhige
(E.D. Va.), Turk (W.D. Va.) and Widener (4th Cir.) have also allowed impleader in these
actions.
Mr. West notes that the 2d circuit (Virginia Beach) and the 5th circuit (Suffolk) are hybrids
in that third-party practice is permitted but the courts automatically sever the third-party
motions for judgment.
It should be noted that this survey is not totally up to date and because state circuit court
opinions are unpublished many of these circuits could have "crossed lines." It is suggested
that each attorney check the case law in his forum to make certain of that circuit's position.
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"the dismissal of third-party motions for judgment alleging actions for
contribution or indemnification on the ground that the third-party plain-
tiff has no existing cause of action according to Virginia case law."
7
The advocates of the Newport News Rule find strength for their position
in the Virginia cases which have held that the right to contribution arises
only upon the rendering of a judgment and upon the payment or discharge
of the common obligation.' Also, there are other cases which have held
that the right to indemnification arises only when actual loss or damage
is established, and that does not occur unless and until the indemnitee
has made payment on the debt.9 Thus, in the impleader context, when a
third-party defendant is brought into the litigation, the proponents of the
above mentioned rule contend that the third-party action is actually pre-
mature because at that point in the proceeding the third-party plaintiff
has no cause of action for contribution or indemnification. 0 The Newport
News Rule requires two adjudications-one on the underlying occurrence
establishing primary liability and then another to adjudicate any second-
ary liability on behalf of third-parties who would be responsible to those
deemed liable in the first proceeding. The latter proceeding would arise
only upon proof of payment in the case of contribution and proof of actual
loss in the case of indemnification.
Another argument set forth by Newport News Rule proponents concerns
a semantic interpretation of the phrase ". . . or may be liable . . ." as it
appears in Rule 3:10. They would contend that the phrase speaks in the
present and not in futurity. In other words, it is their contention that "may
be" could just as easily refer to a present possibility as to a future probabil-
ity. Thus, the effect of this interpretation is that the third-party defendant
would have to be liable to the third-party plaintiff as of the filing of the
original action. According to case law, this would not be possible in contri-
bution or indemnification situations."
A final argument propounded by the Newport News Rule advocates
7. Wright, Third-Party Practice-An Update: The Newport News Rule, Virginia Associa-
tion of Defense Attorneys Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 1, at p.4.
8. Bartlett Roberts v. Recapping, Inc., 207 Va. 789, 793, 153 S.E.2d 193 (1967); Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 202 Va. 527, 532, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961); Van Winckel
v. Carter, 198 Va. 550, 556, 95 S.E.2d 148 (1956); McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190
Va. 851, 857, 59 S.E.2d 121 (1950).
9. Allied Productions Inc., v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 766, 323 S.E.2d 774 (1977); City of
Richmond v. Branch, 205 Va. 424, 430, 137 S.E.2d 882 (1964); American National Bank v.
Ames, 169 Va. 711, 748, 194 S.E. 784 (1938).
10. See generally Brooks v. Brown, 307 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Va. 1969).
11. Wright, Third-Party Practice in Virginia: The Newport News Rule, Virginia Associa-
tion of Defense Attorneys Newsletter, May 1976, p. 9.
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concerns the scope of the supreme court's rule making authority. It is
contended that the rules of court are merely procedural and are not meant
to create or modify any substantive rights a party may have.'2 In the
Brooks case,' 3 Judge Kellam quoted thhe following from *Moore's Federal
Practice: "Third-party practice . . . is procedural . . .[I]t does not
'abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.' It
creates no substantive rights .. ."" Proponents have found further au-
thority for their position in the case of Valley Landscape Co. v. Rolland'15
in which the supreme court stated that ". . . impleader is proper only
when a right to relief exists under the applicable substantive law. ... ""
In sum, it is argued that Rule 3:10 has the effect of creating a right of
contribution or indemnification where none existed theretofore. Such is
beyond the "procedural" authority given the supreme court in the Virginia
Constitution.'"
IV. RULE 3:10 Is ALIVE AND WELL IN VIRGINIA
Rule 3:10 states that a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may
bring into the action another person who is not a party, provided that
person "is or may be liable" to the third-party plaintiff for part or all of
the original plaintiff's claim. A literal interpretation of the Rule would
seem to indicate that the drafters intended the aforemenLioned phrase to
allow the impleader of parties who are potentially liable to the third-party
plaintiff. The phrase speaks to the possibility of future liability; in other
words, if there is a possibility that such a party could, in the future, be
held accountable to the third-party plaintiff, then that party can be im-
pleaded into the present proceeding via this Rule.
An extremely poignant analogy can be drawn between Rule 3:10 and
Rule 3:9, which sanctions the use of cross-claims. The original Rule 3:9
stated that "A defendant may, . . . plead as a cross-claim any cause of
action that he has against one or more other defendants. ... " The classic
12. Id.
13. See note 10 supra.
14. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 14.03. This language was also quoted with approval in
Uptagrafft v. U.S., 315 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. .318 (1963).
15. 218 Va. 257, 237 S.E.2d 120 (1977).
16. Id. at 263 (quoting Wright & Miller, 6 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1446, 250
(1971).
17. Virginia Const., Art. VI, § 5, states:
The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules governing the. . . prac-
tice and procedures to be used in the courts of the Commonwealth, but such rules shall
not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, frcm time to time, be
established by the General Assembly.
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case that dealt with the Rule in this form was City of Richmond v.
Branch."' In that case, the plaintiff, who was injured when his car hit a
deep hole in a city street, sued both the city and the construction firm that
had repaired the street. The city filed a cross-claim against the contractor
alleging that it was entitled to be indemnified for any damages arising out
of the performance of the contract. The supreme court held that the lower
court had properly dismissed the cross-claim on the ground that the city
had no claim for indemnification when it filed the cross-claim. Under Rule
3:9 as it was then stated, a party could plead as a cross-claim only a cause
of action which it then had. (This is precisely the position taken by the
advocates of the Newport News Rule in interpreting Rule 3:10). Appar-
ently the supreme court did not approve of this interpretation of the Rule
and in January, 1975,' 9 they amended the Rule to specifically include any
potential secondary liability by inserting the words "or may have" into the
above quoted sentence immediately after the italicized words. This revi-
sion appears to reverse the interpretation of the Rule taken in City of
Richmond v. Branch.2" It can be persuasively argued that the supreme
court intended a similar interpretation when it used nearly identical lan-
guage in drafting Rule 3:10.
There are relatively few Virginia cases which have applied Rule 3:10;
but, in the ones that have, the impleader of parties with contingent liabil-
ity has been expressly sanctioned. In a recent federal case,2' applying Vir-
ginia law,2 in was held that the Rule was valid and should be given effect
in an indemnity situation. In that case, the administrator of the decedent's
estate brought an action against the bank for wrongful death. The bank
in turn filed a third-party action for indemnity against the decedent's
employer. The employer, as third-party defendant, relied on Brooks2
(which was a pre-Rule 3:10 case) for the proposition that a cause of action
which had not yet occurred was not the proper subject of a third-party
action. The court in Bell was not persuaded by this argument and deter-
18. 205 Va. 424, 137 S.E.2d. 882 (1964).
19. 215 Va. 578 (1975).
20. See Note, Twentieth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law, 1974-1975, 61
VA. L. REV. 1627, 1804 (1975), where it is stated that the amendment "clarified a troublesome
ambiguity by specifically allowing a defendant to plead against a co-defendant not only
causes of action that he is prepared to show are valid in fact but also those that he 'may have.'
This approach assures the heretofore uncertain validity of a contingent cross-claim that
matures only if the cross-claiming defendant is held liable for all or part of the prayed
judgment."
21. Bell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 57 F.R.D. 632 (E.D. Va. 1972).
22. More specifically the case dealt with the application of Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to the claim asserted as determined by substantive state law.
23. Brooks, note 10 supra.
1979]
618 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:613
mined that the literal language of the Rule allowed for a third-party action
under these circumstances despite the fact that the third-party plaintiff
had suffered no loss to trigger the indemnification cause of action at that
time.
In the case of Valley Landscape Co. v. Rolland,24 the Virginia Supreme
Court considered Rule 3:10. There, the third-party plaintiff impleaded on
a third-party beneficiary contract theory. However, the court clearly indi-
cated that secondary liability was a proper subject for third-party action.?
Another argument that can be advanced in support of ihird-party prac-
tice is that by its very nature it is a type of declaratory judgment proceed-
ing which is expressly sanctioned by the Virginia Code.2' Thus, when the
court determines the future liability of the third-party defendant it is
carrying out the same purpose as a declaratory judgment proceeding,
namely, to afford relief from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant
upon the controversy by declaring the rights of the parties before they
mature.2
An argument advanced by proponents of the Newport News Rule is that
the Rules of the Supreme Court are strictly procedural by nature and
therefore should have no effect on existing substantive law. However,
24. Valley Landscape, note 15 supra.
25. In that case, 218 Va. at 263, the court stated:
Under Rule 3:10 a defendant can bring in a third-party defendant only for the
purpose of passing through to the third-party defendant all or part of the liability
which might be imposed on the defendant by the plaintiff as the result of the conduct
of the third-party defendant. Rule 3:10 is the state counterpart of Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the discussion of when a third-party action is
proper, Wright and Miller, 6 FEDERAL PRACTIC AND PROCEDURE § 1446, 245-50 (1971),
states:
'Rule 14(a) authorizes defendant to bring into a lawsuit any person "not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him." (Footnote omitted).
'A third-party claim may be asserted under Rule 14(a) only when the third
party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or
when the third party is secondarily liable to defendant. The secondary or deriva-
tive liability notion is central and it is irrelevant whether the basis of the third-
party claim is indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied war-
ranty, or some other theory. But impleader is proper only when a right to relief
exists under the applicable substantive law. . . .' (Footnotes omitted). See also
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 76 (3d ed. 1976).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
27. Regarding the purposes of a declaratory judgment act, see generally Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 177 S.E.2d 519 (1970); Criterion Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas.
Co., 210 Va. 446, 171 S.E.2d 669 (1970).
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Judge Merhige in the Bell decisions directly addressed this contention and
concluded that "the issues of substantive and procedural law are so inter-
twined as to make a concrete distinction between them overly formalis-
tic.,,29
Finally, since the stated purpose of the Rules of the Supreme Court is
to promote judicial economy, 30 a literal interpretation of Rule 3:10 allowing
the impleader of a potentially liable third-party defendant would seem to
be harmonious with this purpose. Such an application of Rule 3:10 would
permit additional judicial efficiency by eliminating both time delays and
further expenses by having directly related matters disposed of in a single
proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
The most recent third-party practice case to reach the supreme court
was Southern States Cooperative, Inc. v. Norfolk and Western Railway
Co.3 ' That case was based on an indemnification provision in a lease be-
tween Southern States as lessee, and Norfolk and Western as lessor. At the
time the action was filed there was no adjudication of a loss sustained by
the lessor which would have triggered a cause of action for indemnification.
Although indemnification was disallowed for other reasons,3 the supreme
court did not attack the validity of third-party practice. The briefs of both
sides argued the contentions herein treated concerning the validity of Rule
3:10 and the Newport News Rule. However, the court chose not to address
the issue in its opinion, which indicates that the court considered the
validity of Rule 3:10 well-settled.
28. Bell, note 21 supra.
29. Judge Merhige's feelings on the matter were stated as follows at 57 F.R.D. at 634:
It is arguable at first blush that the change in Virginia procedural law should have
no bearing upon existent substantive law, a contention supported by traditional rules
of statutory construction. (Citation omitted). Nevertheless, the court concludes that
the general principle is inapplicable here in the light of the history of Virginia proce-
dural law with respect to third party suits.
While the same substantive rule could well remain in effect despite the procedural
change in Virginia practice, the result thereby is clearly inconsistent with the liberal
spirit of said procedural changes (which in effect are modeled in turn upon the liberal
language of Rule 14 F.R.C.P.). In short, the issues of substantive and procedural law
are here so intertwined as to make a concrete distinction between them overly formalis-
tic. This result at least prompts a re-evaluation of the Virginia substantive rule.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3(a) (Repl. Vol. .1977).
31. 219 Va. _ 247 S.E.2d 461 (1978).
32. Indemnification was not allowed on the ground that a common carrier can not, for
public policy reasons, be allowed to contract away its potential tort liability.
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In sum, both the weight of authority and the spirit of the Rules of the
Supreme Court lead to the conclusion that a presently existing substantive
right to contribution or indemnification is not a sine qua non to invoking
the procedural right of third-party impleader.
John M. Claytor
